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28 February 1961

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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
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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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West Germany: Adenauer, in his talks with Macmillan in London on 22-23 February, gave the British the impression that he was better briefed and more receptive than a year ago to the proposition that West Germany's international payments imbalances should be corrected by increased foreign aid and arms purchases. He reportedly gave no assurance, how-OK ever, that West Germany would assume continuing foreign commitments. The chancellor spoke of the need for a more 25X1 flexible attitude on Berlin; in general, he was described as "relaxed and cautious" on Berlin. He had much to say about 25X1 "revivifying" NATO, and expressed confident that De Gaulle 25X1 would be cooperative while hinting that West Germany had no intention of being frozen out of a major role in NATO by any kind of tripartite directing body in the alliance.

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DAILY BRIEF


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Situation in the Congo

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The Di	ritish charge in Damaka, who mot with Dungidant
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Keita on 23 agreement removal of The charge the UN made to many me surrounding morale and to increase Premie	Within the past two weeks, as reportedly issued Mauser rifles and ammunition embers of his Conakat party in Elisabethville and the g villages. However, he appears to be trying to raise to guard against an anti-Conakat uprising, rather than

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Chinese Nationalist Forces in Laos

General Ouane, chief of the general staff, has told an American observer that the Laotian armed forces plan to use the Chinese Nationalist irregulars only for the protection of Namtha Province, where most of them are located. Ouane, who recently returned to Vientiane from consultations with the irregulars, puts their number at 4,000 effectives plus an equal number of dependents. Although Nationalist China has now indicated willingness to withdraw those irregulars "subject to its control" from Burma and Laos, a substantial number may not be in this category.

The People's Daily commentary of 27 February drew attention to a joint statement issued in Xieng Khouang on 23 February by Souvanna Phouma and Neo Lao Hak Sat leader Prince Souphannouvong, protesting against "the use of Kuomintang remnant bandits by the United States." The commentary also cited a recent statement by Kong Le warning that if the Nationalists are not withdrawn, "measures similar to those adopted by the Burmese Government" will be taken to get rid of them.

Peiping is using the presence of Nationalist irregulars in Laos to link Communist China's national interests more closely to the Laotian crisis. This issue could be used by Peiping to justify a more active military role in Laos, and the presence of an old enemy on China's southwestern border would become a useful issue for Peiping in any international conference in which it might take part.

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Adenauer and Macmillan Talks

Although Adenauer's talks with Macmillan produced no important decisions, they were conducted in a constructive and cordial atmosphere and can be viewed as furthering the good relations established by Macmillan's visit to Bonn last August. Adenauer's proposal that the Western European Union be utilized as a means for political consultation between Britain and the six continental Common Market nations is probably viewed by the British as a friendly gesture.

Adenauer's failure to give assurances of future foreign aid contributions appears to conflict with the general commitment Foreign Minister von Brentano made in Washington on 17 February for a continuing foreign aid program for underdeveloped countries. 25X6 25X6 Over the week end, Erhard continued to stress in speeches in Cologne and Nuremberg that it is only a matter of "luck" that Bonn has nearly a billion-dollar surplus available for a special 1961 aid program and that this cannot be expected every year. 25X1

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